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‘Smart’ IV pumps – how smart are they? 
 
Smart pumps, incorporating dose error reduction software, are widely promoted as 
a patient safety intervention.[1-2] This software checks programmed intravenous 
infusion rates against pre-set limits for each drug in the pump’s ‘drug library’ with 
the aim of reducing the risk of infusion rates that are too high or too low. Smart 
pumps were reported to be in use in 68% of US hospitals in 2011,[3] although this 
figure does not tell us about how they are used nor in which clinical areas. A study of 
their use in the UK suggests that their use is less widespread, and that although 
smart pumps may be in use within an organization, they may only be used in some 
clinical areas or for some kinds of infusion.[4]   
 
Although widely advocated, as with many other patient safety interventions [5,6,7] 
the evidence for smart pumps’ benefit is not clear-cut. There is no conclusive 
evidence that smart pump use does indeed prevent medication errors and adverse 
drug events, and little is known about the kinds of errors that still occur with their 
use. [8,9] 
 
In this issue, Schnock et al [10] aim to shed light on some of these issues by 
documenting the prevalence and types of errors associated with intravenous 
infusions in ten US hospitals using smart pumps. Pairs of observers visited 
participating clinical areas and identified any discrepancies between each infusion 
and its corresponding medication order plus relevant organizational policies.  This 
method can reveal only errors that can be identified visually from an infusion in 
progress; any errors in the preparation of the infusion, such as the wrong 
concentration being prepared, will not be identified unless the corresponding label is 
also incorrect. This approach also focuses on errors in medication administration and 
does not include prescribing errors involving incorrect infusion rates, which smart 
pumps may also have a role in preventing. Even so, the paper suggests a very high 
rate of errors, with 60% of 1,164 observed infusions reported as having one or more 
errors.  At face value, this figure seems very high, but it does include procedural 
violations as well as what would usually be considered to be medication 
administration errors, and as the authors point out, very few (five) were judged to 
be potentially harmful. 
 
The five potentially significant medication administration errors comprised four 
judged to be “errors that would have required increased monitoring to preclude 
harm” (category D) and one “error likely to cause temporary harm” (category E).  
The four Category D errors were two wrong rate errors, one omission error and one 
expired drug error; the Category E error was an omission error. The error rate based 
on these five more serious errors is just 0.4% of infusions, and thus much lower than 
the headline figure of 60%.   
 
This hundredfold discrepancy highlights one of the challenges in interpreting the 
literature in this field: different researchers and practitioners are likely to have 
different views on what should be included and excluded as errors. For quantitative 
studies of medication administration error rates, this is particularly important.[11]  In 
particular, Schnock et al [10] included as errors many examples of procedural 
violations.  These may be important indicators of underlying culture but would not 
be included as errors in many other studies in this field. One study has shown 
evidence of an association between a particular procedural violation (not checking 
patient identification) and medication administration errors. [12] However, Schnock 
et al included as errors other procedural issues, such as discontinued infusions being 
disconnected from the patient but still connected to the pump; these are unlikely to 
be considered important by many healthcare professionals. Caution is therefore 
needed when interpreting and comparing different quantitative studies, even where 
the same data collection methods are used. 
 
The paper also reveals some important differences among the ten participating 
hospitals.  There was wide variation in non-adherence to smart pump use (ranging 
from 0 to 38% of infusions for which the smart pump was not used at all or the drug 
library bypassed, negating any benefits of dose range checking) and other types of 
medication administration error (ranging from 6% to 60% infusions, excluding those 
relating to smart pump non-adherence). This ten-fold difference in medication 
administration error rates is largely accounted for by variation in the prevalence of 
medications being administered without an accompanying medication order, mainly 
the infusion of fluids at a low rate to keep the vein open, which ranged from 3% to 
53% of observed infusions across the ten sites. As well as events considered to be 
medication administration errors, there was also wide variation in adherence to 
other procedural issues. Policy violations were defined based on the policy in place 
at each organization, and the prevalence and types of violation will therefore 
depend on the policy.  For example, if a hospital policy stipulates a large number of 
requirements for the information on an infusion bag label, there are more 
opportunities for violation of these requirements than in a hospital that requires 
only the patient’s name and identification number.   
 
Schnock et al [10] also highlight how policies may be no longer fit for purpose in the 
context of computerised prescriber order entry and barcode medication 
administration systems. Specifically, some policies require the time at which an 
infusion was started to be documented on the infusion label, but this information 
will be captured automatically in organisations using barcode medication 
administration systems and electronic medication administration records.  In this 
context, adding this information by hand to the label can be viewed as a redundant 
step, leading to staff ignoring this part of the policy.  Perhaps importantly, the ten 
study hospitals were also a convenience sample, selected from attendees at a 
healthcare technology safety meeting who volunteered to participate. Infusion 
practices may therefore be even more diverse beyond this self-selected sample.  
 
In relation to the role of smart pumps, it seems that the picture is still not clear. 
Smart pumps are likely to be only as smart as the rest of the system in which they 
operate. As with many healthcare technologies, their benefits are likely to depend 
on how they are used, how they are integrated within practice, and the interface 
between humans and technology. Qualitative as well as quantitative methods are 
likely to be needed to explore these issues.[13]  Even when used as part of a closed 
loop system, integrated with computerised prescriber order entry and barcode 
medication administration systems, smart pumps are unlikely to affect adherence to 
other procedures relating to the safe administration of intravenous infusions. It is 
important that we do not regard smart pumps as a ‘plug and play’ technology to be 
added into existing systems for intravenous medication administration; instead they 
should be used as an opportunity for transformation of the whole system.  
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